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I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of the Internet and increased capabilities of computers
have presented new challenges to community correctional agencies supervising
adjudicated sex offenders. Despite the many productive ways in which com-
puters and the Internet can be applied, ample opportunities exist to utilize them
in manners that undermine rehabilitative and public safety objectives.' Procur-
ing child pornography,2 cruising for potential victims, and networking with
other sex offenders are just a few ways new technology is used to serve the in-
terests of the sex offender.
3
1 See infra text and accompanying notes 44-71 for a discussion of ways pedophiles misuse
the Internet.
2 European authorities are making efforts to call sexual photographs of children "child abuse
images" rather than "child pornography." Jennifer 8. Lee, High Tech Helps Child Pornographers
and Their Pursuers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at 22. Although the author supports these efforts,
illegal sexual depictions of minors are referred to in this article as child pornography.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 44-7 1.
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In response to the threats posed by this special population, many sen-
tencing courts and supervision agencies 4 have authorized supervising officers to
search offenders' computers for signs of illegal or inappropriate material or in-
dications that the user has engaged in violative conduct online.5 Some courts
and supervising agencies have imposed conditions restricting computer use or
Internet access.6 However, both of these measures are employed without the
benefit of clear legal guidance from higher courts or legislative bodies. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence relevant to searches of probationers and parolees
provides little direction for agencies conducting probation searches.7 Moreover,
some appellate courts have closely scrutinized limitations on computer activities
as computers and the Internet become more integral to daily life.8 Yet these
federal appellate decisions broadening offenders' "virtual" mobility have not
fully accounted for the risks assumed when permitting sex offenders to have
online access, and they threaten to undermine effective sex offender supervision
practices. 9
This article contends that prohibitions on Internet access for convicted
sex offenders represent an appropriate balance between public safety interests
and the offenders' liberty interests in many cases. Therefore, courts should not
adopt a per se rule against complete Internet bans. It is further asserted that sus-
picionless searches of sex offenders' computer equipment should withstand
Fourth Amendment scrutiny when conducted in a reasonable manner pursuant to
a condition of supervision authorizing searches. Section H examines the re-
search on sex offending behavior and discusses ways in which pedophiles are
4 Parole - a conditional release from incarceration - and probation - a community-based
sentence in lieu of incarceration-are both included in the term "supervision agencies." In many
jurisdictions, typically in the parole system, the supervision agency has some authority to impose
conditions of supervision. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 508.221 (Vernon 2003) (permit-
ting parole panel to impose conditions of parole that would be permissible for court to impose
upon probationer); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-3-7 (2003) (permitting Prisoner Review Board to
impose conditions of parole).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2003).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Cabot, 325 F.3d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fields,
324 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11 th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 734 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122,
124 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 981 (2003); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 160
(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1002 (2002); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1201
(10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999): United States v.
Deaton, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1183 (E.D. Ark. 2002); United States v. Ebihara, No. 01 CR.225-
01(RWS), 2002 WL 432378, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002); In re A.K.W., No. CX-02-1665,
2003 WL 21384893, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 17, 2003); see also Geoffrey Fattah, Judge Pull-
ing Internet Plug, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Nov. 27, 2002, at Al.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 103-22 (identifying issues related to correctional super-
vision searches yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court).
8 See, e.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.
9 See infra Part V.A.
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known to use computers to entertain their illegal interests. Section III outlines
the jurisprudence related to community correctional supervision searches and
identifies important aspects of this area undeveloped to this point. Section IV
details recent cases challenging conditions of supervision that place limitations,
including outright prohibitions, on computer and Internet use. Finally, Section
V proposes considerations for the development of the law in a direction that
promotes effective sex offender supervision without significant adverse effects
on the legitimate liberty interests of adjudicated offenders.
II. SEXUAL OFFENDING IN THE INTERNET AGE: A PRIMER
During the past few decades there has been increased scientific attention
in the United States, Canada, and Europe focused on sexually offending behav-
ior. 10 Although the information gained from these studies has not answered all
the questions about the etiology of sexual offending, it has shed light on many
aspects of offending behavior relevant to rehabilitation and community protec-
tion and, therefore, is relevant to criminal justice practitioners and the legal
community. Meanwhile, another phenomenon impacting sex offender manage-
ment issues developed, and this phenomenon has created new concerns for gov-
ernment agencies tasked with supervising sex offenders. The digitization of
America and the dramatic growth of the Internet have revolutionized sexual
offending in ways that challenge effective supervision practices."
Contemporary research indicates that sexually offending behavior, like
many other behaviors, is a process rather than an isolated event or act. 12 This
process, termed by many as the "offense cycle,"' 3 is comprised primarily of
mental states, thoughts, and behaviors.' 4 Of particular interest to risk manage-
10 See generally Stephen M. Hudson & Tony Ward, Future Directions, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE:
THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 481 (D. Richard Laws & William O'Donohue eds.,
1997). This is evidenced by the increase in scholarly journals and organizations devoted to the
study of sexual offender behavior and related topics. One prominent example is the Association
for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, incorporated in 1984. During this same period, community-
based correctional agencies have developed supervision practices for this unique offender popula-
tion. See Georgia F. Cumming & Maureen M. Buell, Relapse Prevention as a Supervision Strat-
egyfor Sex Offenders, 8 SEXUAL ABUSE: A J. RESEARCH & TREATMENT 231, 231-32 (1996).
II See infra text accompanying notes 44-71.
12 See Ray Wyre, Pornography and Sexual Violence: Working with Sex Offenders, in
PORNOGRAPHY: WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 236, 237 (Catherine Itzen ed., 1992).
13 The process has been labeled as the "offense cycle," "abuse cycle," or "assault cycle."
There is some contention within the field of psychology whether offending behavior is best de-
scribed as a constantly recurring "cycle" or as distinctly interrupted "chains." See Mark S. Carich,
In Defense of the Assault Cycle: A Commentary, 11 SEXUAL ABUSE: A J. RESEARCH &
TREATMENT 249 (1999). In using the term offense cycle, this article seeks to communicate the
process and the interrelatedness of the stages. The question of whether this process is a cycle or
chain is outside the scope of this article.
14 See, e.g., Wyre, supra note 12, at 237.
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ment are the roles of cognitive distortions 15 and sexual arousal to children. Por-
nography, especially sexual images of children, appears to impact both of these
risk factors. 16
Sexual offenders consume pornography at a higher rate than do non-
offenders. 17 The exact role of pornography in the etiology of sexual abuse has
been debated; however, there is considerable evidence that pornography use
impacts the offense cycle, even if it cannot be considered a "cause" of offending
behavior.18 Pornography is very closely linked with sexual fantasy and sexual
fantasy is thought to fuel the engine of sexual behavior, including abusive be-
havior.19 For a significant number of offenders, pornography affects the offense
cycle by strengthening cognitive distortions, reducing inhibitions, and reinforc-
ing deviant sexual arousal. 0
Pornography use can strengthen cognitive distortions by reinforcing the
seeds of justification and rationalization in the offender's mind.21 For example,
it has been noted that most pornographic depictions of coerced sex portray the
encounter as one where the resistant woman eventually changes her mind and
enjoys rape.22 These depictions of male entitlement and domination can rein-
force the beliefs and perceptions of a mind inclined toward rape.23 Similarly,
15 Cognitive distortions have been described as "self-statements made by offenders that allow
them to deny, minimize, justify, and rationalize their behavior." William D. Murphy, Assessment
and Modification of Cognitive Distortions in Sex Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
331, 332 (W.L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990). Common examples of sex offender distortions in-
clude: "We were just playing," "I did what she wanted," or "I didn't really hurt anybody." See id
at 333 tbl. 1. In a detailed discussion of sex offenders' distortions, Langton and Marshall discuss
distortions and their relevance at three stages of the offense cycle: preoffense distortions, distor-
tions arising during the offense, and postoffense distortions. Calvin M. Langton & W.L. Marshall,
The Role of Cognitive Distortions in Relapse Prevention Programs, in REMAKING RELAPSE
PREVENTION WITH SEX OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK 167, 170-75 (D. Richard Laws et al. eds.,
2000).
16 See infra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
17 W.L. Marshall, The Use of Sexually Explicit Stimuli by Rapists, Child Molesters, and Non-
offenders, 25 J. SEX RESEARCH 267, 279-80 (1988) [hereinafter Marshall, Sexually Explicit Stim-
uli].
18 See Mary R. Mufin & D.R. Laws, The Influence of Pornography on Sexual Crimes, in
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 15, at 73, 88.
19 See Wyre, supra note 12, at 238, 243. The seminal FBI study of serial sexual killers also
recognizes the importance of the fantasy-behavior link. See ROBERT K. RESSLER, ET. AL., SEXUAL
HOMICIDE: PATrERNS AND MoTIvEs 215 (1988).
20 See infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
21 See Wyre, supra note 12, at 239.
22 Id. at 236.
23 W.L. Marshall, Revisiting the Use of Pornography by Sexual Offenders: Implications for
Theory and Practice, 6 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 67, 72-73 (2000) [hereinafter Marshall, Revisit-
ing].
[Vol. 106
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss1/9
GUARDRAILS ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
the child molester is likely to involve themes in his24 sexual fantasies of children
that portray the offender as in control or the child as cooperative and enthusias-
tic. 25 Pornography can similarly reinforce these beliefs.2 6 In a study of child
pornography and online activities, researchers noted that offenders who con-
sumed pornography gave themselves "permission" to abuse based on their rein-
forced beliefs that no harm was done.27 By viewing photographs in which the
children were smiling and appeared happy, some offenders reinforce their dis-
torted views that children are willing participants in the abuse.28
Many offenders employ external disinhibitors29 in the pre-offense stages
of their cycle.30  Most often, alcohol is the "offense-facilitative" intoxicant
used. 31 However, significant numbers of child molesters report using pornogra-
phy as part of their pre-offense preparation. 32 Marshall found that among abus-
ers who reported that sexually explicit materials incited their offenses, more
than half "deliberately used the stimuli in their typical planned preparation for
offending." 33 It is debatable whether the purposeful use of pornography in the
pre-offense stages indicates that use causes offending or is simply a symptom of
24 By using gender-specific language, this article risks reinforcing a popular myth that all sex
offenders are male. Approximately twenty percent of sexual offenders who offend against chil-
dren are female. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS & FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS, at
http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2003). This article seeks to
minimize the use of gender-specific language but uses it at some points for ease of the reader.
25 Marshall, Revisiting, supra note 23, at 72.
26 Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor, Child Pornography and the Internet: Perpetuating a Cycle of
Abuse, 23 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY J. 331, 340 (2002).
27 Id.
28 Id. The researchers noted one case in which the distorted thinking that children enjoy mo-
lestation enabled the offender to ignore contrary indications, such as when the victim cried and
covered her face with her nightgown. Id. For more discussion of this issue, see Marshall, Revisit-
ing, supra note 23, at 72-73. See also Langton & Marshall, supra note 15, at 174 ("Cognitive
distortions arising during the offense result from the offender's selective and biased processing of
social information (i.e., operations). The sum effect of these biases is the facilitation of the of-
fense by minimizing awareness of inhibiting features such as distress and physical resistance from
the victim.") (emphasis in original).
29 As its name suggests, a disinhibitor is something that reduces a person's "reservations or
prohibitions against engaging in sexual activities." CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., GLOSSARY
OF TERMS USED IN THE MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 9 (1999), available
at http://www.csom.org/pubs/glossary.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2003) [hereinafter CTR. FOR SEX
OFFENDER MGMTI. Cognitive distortions are an example of an internal disinhibitor. Id.
30 See W.L. Marshall, Pedophilia: Pscyhopathology & Theory, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE, supra
note 10, at 152, 162 [hereinafter Marshall, Pedophilia].
31 Id.
32 Marshall, Sexually Explicit Stimuli, supra note 17, at 280.
33 Id. at 284.
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an offender mindset, yet even those skeptical of a causal relationship acknowl-
edge pornography's potentially catalytic properties.
34
A more dangerous effect of pornography on offending dynamics is its
reinforcement of deviant sexual arousal. The role of sexual arousal in managing
offenders is difficult to overstate, as sexual arousal to children is the greatest
predictor of risk for recidivism. 35 Sexual preference is thought to be a rather
static trait;36 however, some conditioning can affect sexual arousal.37 For those
who consume pornography, it is often used as fuel for masturbatory fantasy.
38
Masturbation to this material, by means of operant conditioning, causes the user
to associate the stimulus with a sexual pleasure, thus reinforcing the stimulus. 39
In addition to reinforcing cognitive distortions and sexual preference,
some offenders use pornography to groom victims.4° Grooming is the process
by which an offender manipulates a potential victim in a manner "intended to
reduce [the child's] resistance to sexual abuse."4' By showing pornography to
children, offenders can initiate a discussion about sex and present it to a poten-
tial victim as though it is normal and enjoyable.42 Just as it does in the mind of
the offender, the images can facilitate a distorted view of sex in the mind of the
child. Additionally, pornography can be used to facilitate the progression from
talking about sex to having the child actively participate in sexual behaviors.43
34 See Marshall, Revisiting, supra note 23, at 73. Even when not intentionally sought out and
used for the purpose of emboldening the offender, use of disinhibitors can have that effect. See
Tony Ward & Stephen M. Hudson, A Self-Regulation Model of Relapse Prevention, in REMAKING
RELAPSE PREVENTION WITH SEX OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15, at 79, 92 ("[T]he use
of alcohol and pornography can increase the risk of disinhibition by potentially strengthening the
desire for deviant sex and by decreasing regulatory control.").
35 R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussire, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual
Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 351 (1998).
36 H.E. Barbaree, Stimulus Control of Sexual Arousal: Its Role in Sexual Assault, in
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 15, at 115, 116.
37 This is discussed and illustrated in the context of fetishes by John Junginger, Fetishism:
Assessment & Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, & TREATMENT, supra
note 10, at 92, 96-97.
38 Quayle & Taylor, supra note 27, at 338; see Wyre, supra note 12, at 238.
39 See D.R. Laws & W.L. Marshall, A Conditioning Theory of the Etiology and Maintenance
of Deviant Sexual Preference and Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 15, at
209, 213-14.
40 See, e.g., Wyre, supra note 12, at 240-41; see also infra text accompanying note 276.
41 CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., supra note 29, at 11 ("Typical grooming activities include
gaining the child victim's trust or gradually escalating boundary violations of the child's body in
order to desensitize the victim to further abuse.").
42 Id.
43 Id.
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Just as the Internet has brought about changes in other criminal endeav-
ors, the revolution in computing has altered the practices of sexual offenders in
ways that challenge effective correctional supervision.44 For the probationer,
impermissibly possessing pornography and evading detection was once more
difficult than it is now. A few photographs, videotapes, and magazines were
easily discovered in piles in a closet, under a bed, or behind the seat of a vehicle.
Now several digital images can be hidden on a disk the size of a thumbnail, on a
computer drive, or in a remote data storage service.45
Yet pornography consumption is not the only use to which offenders
can apply modern computer networking technology to their dangerous activities.
Keith Durkin studied the ways in which pedophiles misuse the Internet.46 He
noted that the most prominent manner in which the Internet is abused is as a
means of trafficking child pornography.47 Government sting operations have
garnered significant media attention in recent years,48 and federal court dockets
indicate that the number of prosecutions for pornography offenses has increased
as the Internet has become more prevalent in the nation's households and of-
fices.49
A more alarming use of the Internet involves its utilization as a means
of contacting potential victims. 50 Often, through the use of chat rooms and in-
stant messaging, 51 offenders make use of the online world to meet children and
44 See infra text accompanying notes 45-71.
45 Most of the commercial Internet providers permit users to upload files and documents to the
company's computers where they are privately stored and can be accessed by the user. Conduct-
ing searches of remote storage areas on the Internet has unique legal implications of which a su-
pervision officer should be aware. See David N. Adair, Jr., Looking at the Law, FED. PROBATION,
Sept. 2001, at 66, 68.
46 See Keith F. Durkin, Misuse of the Internet by Pedophiles: Implications for Law Enforce-
ment and Probation Practice, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1997, at 14.
47 Id. at 14. It has also been noted that the availability of digital cameras and high-speed
Internet connections has led to an "explosion" of homemade child pornography. Lee, supra note
2.
48 Durkin, supra note 46, at 14; see, e.g., Cary Aspinwall, Man Is Arrested in Internet Sex
Sting, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 15, 2003, at A22 (discussing a Connecticut man, who was arrested by
FBI agents when he traveled to Tulsa allegedly intending to have sex with a 13-year-old girl);
Rebecca Carr, FBI Cracks Child-Porn Ring on Net, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 19, 2002, at IA,
available at 2002 WL 6593978.
49 The number of defendants sentenced in federal courts for pornography or prostitution
charges increased almost three-fold from 1992 to 2000. Compare U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 520 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1993)
with U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, at 440 (Kath-
leen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001). The numbers for pornography and prostitution crimes
are aggregated for SOURCEBOOK reporting.
50 Durkin, supra note 46, at 15.
51 These online communication systems permit two (or more) users to send messages to each
other in real time. See id. at 15 n.2.
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explore their vulnerabilities.5 2 Characterized as the playground of the new cen-
tury, 53 those who want to meet children can log on to child-oriented web sites
and take advantage of the communication channels they provide.54 Compared to
"traditional" methods 55 of initiating child contact, online prowling for victims is
considered easier, as offenders often perceive their activities to be safer by
means of the Internet's perceived anonymity.56
Durkin also noted that pedophiles use the Internet to engage in inappro-
priate sexual chat with minors.57 This conduct may be considered part of the
grooming process toward contact victimization, yet even absent such intent,
inappropriate communication with children is disconcerting and a public safety
concern.5 8 The case for curbing such behavior is even more compelling when it
involves adjudicated sex offenders. For most offenders under supervision, con-
tact with children constitutes a violation of supervision terms.59
The Internet is also used by pedophiles to network among each other.
60
Durkin noted that this interaction serves as both a support group and an avenue
for the exchange of information. 61 Whereas nonconformists were once stigma-
52 See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999). Accounts of offend-
ers contacting minors online for sexual purposes are common in the news media. See, e.g., Ruben
Castaneda, Man Gets 30 Years for Sex Abuse of 2 Teens, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2002, at B2 (re-
porting on HIV-positive man convicted of sexually assaulting two teenagers he met through online
chat rooms); Teacher Admits Sex Assault, Hous. CHRONICLE, Mar. 26, 1999, at A34 (reporting
that Texas teacher traveled to Illinois to have sex with a fourteen-year-old girl he met in a chat
room).
53 See Durkin, supra note 46, at 15 ("[I]nstead of hanging around the playground looking for
the loneliest kid, potential child molesters simply have to log on.") (quoting B. Kantrowitz et al.,
Child Abuse in Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 14, 1994, at 40).
4 Approximately two-thirds of children in the United States have Internet access at home.
ERIC C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS & INTERNET USE IN THE U.S.:
AUG. 2000, at 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf.
5 Ways in which pedophiles will sometimes facilitate child contact include babysitting,
coaching youth sports activities, or dating single parents with vulnerable children.
56 See Durkin, supra note 46, at 15.
57 Id. For discussion of how easily children can be engaged online to discuss inappropriate
topics, see Bert Sass & Kent Dana, Sex Offenders Sound Alarm, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2002, at
B9, available at 2002 WL 102844870.
58 Computerized stalking and inappropriate communication with children are considered to
have public safety ramifications. See Washington Attorney General Christine Gregoire, Remarks
at the National Conference of Law Reviews (Mar. 28, 2003) (edited and delivered by Narda
Pierce, Solicitor General).
59 See Durkin, supra note 46, at 17; Brian McKay, The State of Sex Offender Probation Super-
vision in Texas, FED. PROBATION, June 2002, at 16, 18-19 (noting that most sex offenders on pro-
bation have limitations on child contact).
60 Durkin, supra note 46, at 15.
61 Id.
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tized and isolated, the Internet has enabled any user to find legitimization in a
virtual community for any viewpoint or interest. 62 Pedophiles have not been left
behind by this capability and are increasingly turning to the Internet for support
and validation.63 This is evident in the express purpose of one group noted by
Durkin:
Alt.support.boy-lovers is a forum for males to discuss their feel-
ings toward boys. It is intended to provide a sense of peer sup-
port for those having difficulties with their feelings, for boy-
lovers who feel isolated with their orientation, and for those
who have no other avenue of discussion than via a group such
as this.64
Durkin described the tone of postings in the newsgroup as one of validation.
65
By shedding pejorative terms, "boy-lovers" seek to affirm and normalize their
sexual interests.66 Researchers have observed that child pornography users net-
worked on the Internet create their own social norms where pedophilia is not
deviant.67 More than simply neutralizing social stigma to refrain from abusive
behavior, these online support groups can further entrench a pedophile's belief
that sexual contact with children is inherently permissible.
68
The Internet also serves as an information exchange for pedophiles,
permitting users to swap information useful to the pedophilic lifestyle. 69 In his
62 The Internet has mitigated social isolation for many who may be characterized as "fringe"
or deviant. The networking capabilities of the Internet facilitate support and validation for almost
any viewpoint or interest. For examples, see The American Nazi Party, at
http://www.americannaziparty.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2002); The Raellian Revolution, at
http://www.rael.org/int/english/index.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
63 Durkin, supra note 46, at 15.
64 Id.
65 Id.
6 Id. One example of this can be found at the website for the National Man/Boy Love Asso-
ciation. National Man/Boy Love Association, at http://www.nambla.org (last visited Aug. 19,
2003). NAMBLA is an organization that normalizes sexual contact between men and boys and
advocates for the abolition of laws prohibiting sex between adults and male children.
67 See E. Quayle et al., The Internet and Offending Behavior: A Case Study, 6 J. SEXUAL
AGGRESSION 78,94 (2000).
68 Those supporting a sex offender's right to liberal online access may contend that the support
group function of the Internet can help offenders cope with the social stigmas that accompany life
as a sex offender. Although there is likely therapeutic and public safety value in ensuring that
offenders properly deal with the frustrations of being a publicly identified sex offender, interac-
tions among pedophiles are best limited to those occurring under clinical or correctional supervi-
sion. Without proper supervision, there is a significant likelihood that the online discussion of
healthy adjustment will degenerate to one that mutually reinforces cognitive distortions.
69 Quayle et al., supra note 67, at 94.
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study of Internet use, Durkin noticed postings instructing readers how to obtain
pedophilic materials such as comic books and poetry.7° In one federal court
case involving possession of child pornography, the court observed that the de-
fendant emailed other computer users and advised them how to "scout" single
parents through Alcoholics Anonymous or welfare offices to identify vulnerable
children.71
Because the Internet can be such a dangerous place for adjudicated sex-
ual offenders to spend their time unsupervised, courts and government agencies
have implemented measures to monitor activities and prevent unauthorized be-
haviors by adjudicated offenders.72 Computer searches designed to detect signs
of misuse are employed by some agencies. 73 However, this practice is not with-
out the peril that accompanies excursions into uncharted legal territories.
III. SEARCHES BY SUPERVISION OFFICERS
74
The Fourth Amendment safeguards citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures,75 and the protection afforded by this Amendment is not
denied those convicted of crimes.76 However, the United States Supreme Court
has held that probationers and parolees do not enjoy the same degree of liberty
70 Durkin, supra note 46, at 15.
71 See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1002
(2002).
72 See McKay, supra note 59, at 19-20.
73 See, e.g., David Harper, Judge Toughens Child-Porn Sentence, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 27,
2002, at A13 (reporting that federal judge imposed condition of supervision permitting computer
searches upon reasonable suspicion); Catie O'Toole, New Program Aimed at Sex Offenders: State
Grant Will Give County Probation Officers Greater Tools for Supervision, THE POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 5, 2001, at BI (discussing a probation supervision program implementing
home and computer searches).
74 This article's analysis is predicated upon the fact that there is no meaningful distinction
between probation and parole status for purposes of determining Fourth Amendment expectations
of privacy. The Supreme Court has not made any differentiations, and other courts have expressly
stated that no difference exists. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n.1 (9th Cir.
1991); State v. Smith, 540 A.2d 679, 691 n.13 (Conn. 1988); State v. Malone, 403 So. 2d 1234,
1238 (La. 1981).
75 The Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; see also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969) ("Nothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the per-
sonal security of our citizenry .... ); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) ("The
decisions of [the Supreme Court] have time and time again underscored the essential purpose of
the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.").
76 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) ("A probationer's home, like anyone
else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be 'reasonable."').
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as that exercised by other citizens. 7 Although the nuances of community cor-
rectional search and seizure law have not been fully articulated, the general
landscape can be ascertained from the Supreme Court's decisions.
Despite obvious connections to the criminal justice system, the Supreme
Court has labeled community correctional searches as administrative searches,
akin to school searches 78 and commercial regulatory searches, 79 which are out-
side the realm of law enforcement searches.8° When analyzing administrative
search cases, courts weigh the government's need to conduct the search against
the individual's privacy interest to determine whether a particular search is rea-
sonable.8'
The Supreme Court first addressed community correctional searches in
82Griffin v. Wisconsin. Wisconsin probation officers received information that
Griffin may have possessed firearms in violation of the terms of his probation.83
Probation officers, escorted by plainclothes police officers, went to Griffin's
house and conducted a search of his residence. 84 Their search revealed a hand-
gun, and Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.
In affirming the trial court's decision not to suppress the handgun as
fruit of an illegal search, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that probationary
status diminishes a person's reasonable expectation of privacy to the degree that
probation officers may search upon reasonable belief of illegal activity. 86 The
United States Supreme Court upheld the decision but expressly noted that its
holding did not paint as broad a brushstroke as did the court below.87 Rather
than embracing the broad principle that home searches by probation officers are
permissible when conducted upon reasonable belief, the Court held that the
77 Id. at 874.
78 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
79 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
80 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74. The administrative search is sometimes called the "special
needs" search or regulatory search. See id; CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 13.01 (4th ed. 2000).
81 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 767-
68 (4th ed. 1996).
82 483 U.S. 868.
83 Id. at 871.
94 Id.
85 Id. at 871-72.
86 State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Wis. 1986), affid, 483 U.S. 868.
87 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872 ("[W]e find it unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law ...
that any search of a probationer's home by a probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment as
long as the information possessed by the officer satisfies a federal 'reasonable grounds' stan-
dard.").
20031
11
McKay: Guardrails on the Information Superhighway: Supervising Computer
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
search was permissible because it was based upon a Wisconsin regulation that
satisfied Fourth Amendment requirements.88
As the Supreme Court's first pronouncement of search law in the com-
munity correctional setting, Griffin indicated that aspects of the probation sys-
tem are important factors in the reasonableness inquiry. 89 First, the Court rec-
ognized that the probation system is distinct from law enforcement such that the
usual warrant and probable cause requirements may be dispensed with in some
situations.90 Second, the Court stressed the need of a probation system to be
quick to respond to possible violations.9' Third, the Court acknowledged that
the probation system, to be most effective, must have the ability to deter future
criminal behavior.92
More recently, the Supreme Court unanimously determined that
searches of a probationer's home by a police officer with reasonable suspicion
of illegal activity satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard when
the probationer is subject to a search condition.93 In United States v. Knights,
the defendant was under probation supervision when he was suspected of a new
offense.94  The sentencing court imposed a condition of supervision that re-
quired him to submit to a warrantless search by any probation officer or law
enforcement officer, even where there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 95 Subsequent to Knights' placement on supervision, a deputy sheriff
investigating sabotage of railroad facilities and aware of Knights' search condi-
tion, searched Knights' apartment without a warrant and without Knights' con-
sent at the time of the search.96
The Supreme Court engaged the balancing of interests inquiry to deter-
mine whether the Knights search was permissible.97 On the side of the individ-
ual's privacy interest, the Court noted that imposition of a search condition di-
88 Id. at 873. Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social Services, the agency charged
with supervision of probationers, maintained regulations which permitted probation officers to
search a probationer's home without a warrant if the officers had reasonable grounds to believe
that contraband was present. Id. at 870-71 (citing Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(t)
(1981)).
89 Infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
90 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74.
91 Id. at 876.
92 Id. at 876, 878.
93 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
94 Id. at 114-16.
95 Id. at 114.
96 Id. at 115.
97 See id. at 118-21.
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minished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy. 98 By way of government
interest, the Court pointed to the community correctional system's dual role of
attempting to rehabilitate the offender and preventing future criminal behavior
in a population more prone to criminality than the general public.99 The Court
held that the search pursuant to the authorizing probation condition was permis-
sible when reasonable suspicion is present.100
These two prominent Supreme Court cases provide some direction for
supervision officers monitoring sex offenders' use of the Internet. Officers
searching computers are typically examining hard drives or removable disks for
evidence of behavior that violates the conditions of supervision, such as posses-
sion of pornographic images, communications with children, or accessing inap-
propriate Internet web pages. To the degree that this evidence comprises a file
or document on a magnetic medium, there appears to be no less privacy protec-
tion afforded it compared to traditional hardcopy files.' 0 ' Where a condition of
supervision permits searching an offender's home or specifically permits search-
ing a computer, a supervision officer with reasonable suspicion that evidence of
violative behavior may be found by a search of the computer, may inspect that
computer without a warrant. 10 2 However, it is not clear whether the limits of
searching authority for community correctional officers extend beyond this
situation.
Although Knights has provided guidance on community correctional
search law in a general manner, many contours of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence in this area have not yet been clarified. In deciding Knights, the Court
declined to address three issues important to the development of search and sei-
zure law for probationers and parolees.
The Supreme Court has held that government searches do not violate
the Fourth Amendment when the individual voluntarily consents to the
search. 10 3 However, the Court has thus far refused to determine whether a pro-
bationer's acceptance of the supervision terms, which include a search condi-
tion, constitutes consent to search.1°4 In Knights, the government urged the Su-
preme Court to decide the case on a consent rationale, stating that the defen-
98 Id. at 119-20.
99 Id. at 120-21.
100 Id. at 122.
101 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 75, 80-81 (1994).
102 See United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 1335 (2003).
103 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("It is equally well settled that one of
the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is
a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.").
104 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
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dant's acceptance of the condition constituted a voluntary consent to search.'0 5
However, the Court expressly refused to determine whether Knights' acceptance
of the supervision terms constituted consent to search.
10 6
Courts that have dealt with the consent issue in the community correc-
tional context have reached divergent results. 10 7  The Ninth Circuit decided
Knights below on the basis of consent, concluding that Knights consented to
probation searches. 0 8 The Arkansas Supreme Court, in circumstances similar to
Knights, held that a notice to parolees advising that they may be searched upon
reasonable suspicion constitutes consent to search when signed by the pa-
rolee. 1°9 Similarly, a Virginia appellate court treated a search condition in a
plea-bargained, suspended-sentence order as a voluntary waiver of Fourth
Amendment protections. 110 However, some courts have espoused the opposite
view, contending that consent to search is not voluntarily given when the choice
opposite giving consent is incarceration.1 1'
A second issue not yet addressed by the Supreme Court is whether su-
pervision agents possess the same authority to conduct searches of parolees and
105 Id. at 118. The Court noted that Knights signed the probation order immediately below a
paragraph that stated: "I have received a copy, read and understand the above terms and condi-
tions of probation and agree to abide by same." Id. at 114.
106 Id. at 118 ("We need not decide whether Knights' acceptance of the search condition consti-
tuted consent in the Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights ...
107 Compare Dearth v. State, 390 So. 2d 108, 109-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
defendant did not give voluntary consent to imposition of a search condition when the other alter-
native was incarceration) with State v. Benton, 695 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ohio 1998) (holding that
parolee voluntarily waived Fourth Amendment protections when he signed a consent form to
become eligible for parole).
10s United States v. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 112. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the suppression of evidence on grounds that a search pursuant to a condi-
tion of supervision can only be done for probation purposes. Id. Having concluded that none of
the officers involved could have believed that the search was performed for probation purposes,
the court ruled the warrantless search impermissible. Id. The difference between probation and
investigation searches is explained infra note 113.
109 Cherry v. State, 791 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Ark. 1990). The defendant signed a statement stat-
ing: "Any parolee's person, automobile, residence, or any property under his control may be
searched by a parole officer without a warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds for investigat-
ing whether the parolee has violated the terms of his parole or committed a crime." Id. The facts
in Cherry differ from Knights in that the offender was on parole (instead of probation) and the
search was conducted by a parole officer (rather than a law enforcement officer).
110 Anderson v. Commonwealth, 490 S.E.2d 274, 278 (Va. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 507 S.E.2d
339 (Va. 1998). The court noted that because the sentence was the result of a plea-bargain, it was
imposed upon the defendant's request rather than imposed by the trial court's own initiative. Id.
III See, e.g., Dearth, 390 So. 2d at 110 ("We likewise conclude that Dearth's choice between a
term of imprisonment or a term of supervised freedom [with the search condition] was really no
choice at all."). Brief discussion of this issue is provided in 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH &
SEIZURE 153-54 (3d ed. 2000).
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probationers as compared to law enforcement officers. Historically, the issue
has not been framed by the affiliation of the person conducting the search, but
instead by the purpose of the search. 12  Some courts have maintained that
searches are undertaken to serve one of two possible interests: probation pur-
poses or investigation purposes,' 3 and that searches of offenders conducted
pursuant to a search condition are reasonable only if conducted for probation
purposes. 14 This was the position of the Ninth Circuit prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Knights. 15 However, the Supreme Court settled the issue to
the degree that a search condition and reasonable suspicion are involved'
1 6
Where both reasonable suspicion and a proper search condition are present,
there is no distinction between the searching authority for investigation and pro-
bation purposes. 17 What remains unknown is the degree to which supervision
officers and law enforcement officers have the ability to conduct searches in
other contexts.
The third issue not yet addressed by the Supreme Court is whether
searches of offenders under community correctional supervision can be con-
ducted in the absence of individualized suspicion. This issue, too, has led to
divergent results in courts across the nation," 8 and the Court expressly declined
to rule on it in Knights.19 The subject of suspicionless supervision searches has
often arisen in the context of compelled submission of a urine sample for drug
testing. 20 Most courts dealing with this issue have held that urinalysis testing of
112 See infra note 113.
113 What is the difference between a search for probation purposes and one for investigation
purposes? "Unlike an investigation search, a probation search advances the goals of probation,
the overriding aim of which is to give the [probationer] a chance to further and to demonstrate his
rehabilitation while serving a part of his sentence outside the prison walls." United States v. Oo-
ley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted), overruled in part by United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). A probation search is not one that is merely a subterfuge
for police activity. See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
17 Id.
118 Compare Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]hough not
explicitly contained in the probation statute, we think that a limitation that all searches of proba-
tioners be conducted only upon reasonable cause is inherent in such conditions .... ") with State v.
Smith, 589 N.W.2d 546, 548 (N.D. 1999) ("We hold the search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because 'reasonable suspicion' is not required for a probationary search as long as
the search is reasonable.").
119 534 U.S. at 120 n.6.
120 The Supreme Court has held that urinalysis testing constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
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probationers does not require any individualized suspicion. 121 However, at least
one court has hinted that reasonable suspicion is needed.
1 22
Outside the context of drug testing, courts have been more noticeably
split regarding the role of individualized suspicion in community correctional
searches pursuant to conditions of supervision. 23 Several courts have held that
the reasonable suspicion requirement is inherent in supervision conditions, stat-
utes, or guidelines that permit warrantless searches. 124 The Kentucky Supreme
Court has supported the position that a parolee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the residence that cannot be overcome absent individualized suspi-
cion. 25 The court reversed a conviction based on a parole officer's seizure of a
firearm and drugs during a home visit.1 26 The parole officer entered the resi-
dence after the parolee demonstrated initial reluctance to permit entry. 27 Once
inside, the officer smelled marijuana and conducted a search, uncovering the
prohibited items. 128 The court treated entry into the home as a search 129 and held
that it could not have been conducted without reasonable suspicion. 30
121 See, e.g., State v. Morris, 806 P.2d 407, 410-11 (Haw. 1991) (declaring that no reasonable
suspicion is required to conduct urinalysis where statute permits such tests to be imposed as condi-
tion of supervision); Kopkey v. State, 743 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("We do not
believe there is a prohibition against conducting a search ... via urinalysis in the absence of 'rea-
sonable suspicion' .... "). The Indiana Court of Appeals noted the Supreme Court's willingness
to permit school athletes to be drug tested and concluded: "Certainly, the privacy expectations of a
person convicted of a crime and sentenced to in-home detention should fall below those of a stu-
dent-athlete who has never been suspected of any wrongdoing whatsoever." Kopkey, 743 N.E.2d.
at 337-38 (discussing Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657).
122 State v. Smith, 540 A.2d 679, 691 (Conn. 1988).
123 See supra note 118.
124 See, e.g., Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding inherent
reasonable suspicion requirement in a probation requirement to submit to search); State v. Malone,
403 So. 2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1981) ("[A] probation officer's decision to search must be supported
by something more than a mere hunch .... "); State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a probation offi-
cer have reasonable suspicion before commencing a warrantless search of a probationer's resi-
dence.").
125 Coleman v. Commonwealth, 100 S.W.3d 745, 752 (Ky. 2002).
126 Id. at 746.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 746-47. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that a condition of parole requiring the
parolee to "[p]ermit his parole officer to visit his home and place of employment at any time" did
not grant the officer authority to enter the home without contemporaneous consent by the parolee.
Id. at 750 (quoting 501 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:030 § 6(l)(b) (2000)). Accord State v. Guzman, 990
P.2d 370, 373-74 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a condition of supervision permitting home
visits by the supervision officer did not confer the authority to conduct a search). Yet the Second
Circuit has hinted that a similar condition may confer searching authority upon the officer. See
United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 127 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 981 (2003)
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On the other side, some courts have permitted suspicionless searches
under the auspices of community correctional supervision requirements.' 3 1 In
People v. Reyes, the California Supreme Court permitted suspicionless proba-
tion searches pursuant to properly imposed court requirements so long as they
are not conducted arbitrarily or to harass. 132 In arriving at its conclusion, the
court noted the diminished privacy of the probationer and the deterrent effect of
random searches. 133 However, searches that were unreasonable regarding their
frequency, time of day, duration, motivation, or purpose were not permitted.
134
Most of the community supervision search law has developed outside
the context of computer use. As computers become more prevalent in American
homes, including those homes inhabited by adjudicated sexual offenders, super-
vision agencies have become aware of the need to place guardrails on the infor-
mation superhighway in order to foster rehabilitation and prevent future victimi-
zation. Sentencing courts and parole agencies have begun imposing supervision
conditions limiting or completely prohibiting computer activities, and these
conditions are being tested in many courts.
IV. CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION IMPACTING COMPUTER USE
In the federal court system, statutes limit the judge's discretion over the
supervision conditions that may be imposed upon a criminal defendant placed
on probation or supervised release. 35 When imposing either type of commu-
nity-based sentence, statutes specifically enumerate several conditions that are
mandatory 36 or discretionary, 1 depending upon the circumstances. Such con-
(suggesting that probation officers can inspect a defendant's home and computer and observing
that the defendant is required by terms of supervision to "permit a probation officer to visit him..
• at any time at home or elsewhere.").
130 Coleman, 100 S.W.3d at 752. The court apparently read Knights to mean that reasonable
suspicion is required.
131 See, e.g., People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451 (Cal. 1998).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d) (2000). Probation is a community-based supervision
sentence granted in lieu of incarceration. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implica-
tions of Urine Testing for Evidence of Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1159, 1160 n.5
(1990) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.3 (1984)).
Supervised release, akin to a state parole system, is a community-based supervision term follow-
ing release from incarceration. See id.
136 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (applicable to probation); id. § 3583(d) (applicable to supervised re-
lease).
137 Id. § 3563(b) (applicable to probation); id. § 3583(d) (applicable to supervised release).
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ditions include crime-free behavior, 138 abstinence from illegal drugs,139 or a ban
on unauthorized travel outside the court's jurisdiction.' 4° Additionally, the court
can fashion its own special conditions of supervision.1 41 It is by this authority
that courts have imposed such creative terms as polygraph testing. 1
42
However, the court's discretion in setting supervision conditions is not
unbounded. Where a condition deprives a defendant of liberty or property, the
condition must involve no greater diminishment than is necessary to protect the
public from the defendant's future crimes, deter future criminal conduct, or pro-
vide correctional treatment and training in an effective manner. 43 In making its
determination, the court may consider the nature and circumstances of the crime
and the characteristics of the offender. 144 Although not specifically codified in
some states, most states similarly require that a special condition of supervision
bear some reasonable relationship to the crime or protection of the public.
45
Recent years have seen an increase in the imposition of computer or
Internet restrictions as conditions of supervision. 146  Restrictions have taken
several forms, from complete bans on all Internet use and prohibitions against
possession of a modem, 147 to permissible Internet use with restrictions on certain
138 Id. § 3563(a)(1).
139 Id. § 3563(a)(3).
140 Id. § 3563(b)(14).
141 Id. § 3563(b)(22); id. § 3583(d).
142 See United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding imposition of poly-
graph testing as a condition of supervised release). Conditions of supervision for sexual offenders
have become quite comprehensive, including bans on pornography possession or use, search con-
ditions, and restrictions on computer or Internet use. See, e.g., United States v. Ebihara, No. 01
CR.225-01(RWS), 2002 WL 432378, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002).
143 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d). The differences between the limitations for probation
and supervised release are subtle. Section 3563(b) permits conditions "to the extent that such
conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for
the purposes of indicated in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a)(2)." Id. § 3563(b). Section 3583(d)(2),
pertaining to supervised release, permits the condition to the extent that such condition "involves
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in [18
U.S.C.] section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)." Id § 3583(d)(2).
1,4 Id. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d).
145 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 767 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Mass. 2002) (stating that
conditions must be reasonably related to goals of sentencing and probation, including deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation); State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 452-53 (Ohio 1990) (court
imposing condition should consider whether condition's relationship to the offender, the crime, or
conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d
686, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) ("[P]ermissible conditions should have a reasonable relationship
to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.").
146 See, e.g., Ebihara, 2002 WL 432378, at *3.
147 See United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing condition where
trial court imposed ban on possession or use of computer equipment and ban on use of computer
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online activities. 48 Challenges to these conditions have been built upon conten-
tions that restrictions on Internet use are unnecessarily broad or amount to un-
reasonable restrictions upon the defendant's liberty. 149 These challenges have
created a split among the federal circuits, with the most pronounced differences
evident between the Second and Fifth Circuits.
5 °
A. Second Circuit Disapproval of Internet Bans
The Second Circuit has been fervently opposed to broad Internet restric-
tions. It first addressed the permissibility of Internet restrictions in United
States v. Peterson.151 Larry Peterson was convicted of bank larceny, but a prior
state incest conviction was the basis for imposition of sex offender-related terms
of probation. 52 The sentencing court imposed a condition prohibiting the pos-
session of computer equipment and use of the Internet. 53 On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the Internet ban, noting that the restriction was "neither
reasonably related to [the prior state conviction] nor 'reasonably necessary' to
the sentencing objectives., 154 The court discussed the excessiveness of the re-
system except for employment purposes).
148 M.G. v. Travis, 667 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (1997) (involving a condition prohibiting "participa-
tion in any on-line computer service involving the exchange of pornographic or sexually explicit
messages.").
149 See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167-68 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1002 (2002); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999).
150 Compare United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
981 (2003) (holding that prohibition on Internet access is overbroad) with Paul, 274 F.3d at 170
(permitting complete prohibition on Internet access).
151 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001).
152 Id. at 81. The court also noted that Peterson accessed legal adult pornography on his com-
puter before and after sentencing, and the probation officer believed Peterson posed a "great risk
to the community." Id.
153 Id. The court ordered:
[The] defendant shall not possess, purchase, or use a computer or computer
equipment, which includes: a modem; Internet account; writable or re-writable
CD Rom; [sic] tape backup or removable mass storage device; de-
vice/appliance that can be used to connect to the Internet; digital camera; CDs
(other than original manufacturer's software distribution). The defendant is
prohibited from using any commercial computer systems/services except for
employment purposes as authorized by the probation officer. If allowed to use
a computer for employment, the system shall only contain software required
to perform his/her job.
Id.
154 Id. at 83.
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striction by first observing the importance of computers in contemporary life. 55
Analogizing to another common communication tool, the court reasoned that
such a broad restriction is like banning all telephone use by an offender who
uses the telephone to commit fraud.
156
In striking down the computer and Internet ban, the Second Circuit also
held that the ban was not reasonably necessary to protect the public from future
crimes. 157 The court supported its conclusion by pointing out there was no evi-
dence that Peterson's prior sexual offense had any connection to computer
use.158 Additionally, the court pointed out that restrictions on computer and
Internet use limited Peterson's occupational opportunities, and sentencing
guidelines in place regulate a judge's ability to impose terms precluding a de-
fendant's participation in an occupation or profession. 15 9
The Second Circuit's intolerance of Internet bans became more evident
in United States v. Sofsky. 16° Unlike Peterson, Sofsky involved a defendant who
used the Internet in the commission of his crime.16' Evidence presented at trial
indicated that Gregory Sofsky received more than 1,000 images of child pornog-
raphy through his computer and traded child pornography with others on the
Internet. 162 Upon conviction, the sentencing court banned Sofsky from using a
computer or the Internet.1
63
As was done in Peterson, the Second Circuit struck down the Internet
ban in Sofsky.164 Although it conceded that the restriction was related to the
purposes of sentencing, the court concluded that it "inflict[ed] a greater depriva-
tion on Sofsky's liberty than is reasonably necessary."' 165 The court again em-
ployed its analogy to telephone use first applied in Peterson to support its hold-
ing that the condition was overbroad.
166
155 Id. (noting that computers and the Internet have become "virtually indispensable in the
modem world").
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. (contrasting the facts of United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1999)).
159 Id. at 83 (citing U.S.SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.5).
160 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 981 (2003).
161 Id. at 124.
162 Id.
163 Id. (The trial court ordered: "[T]he defendant may not access a computer, the Internet, or
bulletin board systems at any time, unless approved by the probation officer.") (internal quotations
omitted).
164 Id. at 127.
165 Id. at 126.
166 Id.
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The Sofsky panel brushed aside government contentions that a broad ban
on Internet use was necessary because a probation officer would have great dif-
ficulty monitoring compliance with a term aimed only at restricting access to
pornography online. 167 The court noted that the probation officer was not with-
out any means of monitoring, specifically noting that the officer could first
monitor whether Sofsky used a computer at all, and was permitted to conduct
searches of the computer's hard drive and any removable disks. 68 Further, the
court noted that the government could check Sofsky's compliance through un-
dercover stings by inviting him to respond to emails advertising pornography.1
69
B. Others Affirm Broad Internet Prohibitions
The Fifth Circuit was the first to establish wide approval of online re-
strictions, 170 and it has been followed by the Eighth' 7 ' and Eleventh 72 Circuits.
In United States v. Paul, the Fifth Circuit affirmed imposition of a complete
prohibition on any computer or Internet use. 17 3  Legal problems began for
Robert Scott Paul when he took his personal computer to a repair shop in
Texas. 74 A technician found child pornography on the computer and notified
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.175 After Paul picked up his computer, FBI
agents served a search warrant at his residence. 76 Agents found evidence that
167 Id. at 126-27.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 127.
170 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167-70 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1002
(2002). The Third Circuit was the first to uphold a broad Internet ban in United States v. Cran-
don, 73 F. 3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999); however, its later decisions have established it in the middle
ground. See infra Part IV.C.
171 The Eighth Circuit could also be placed in Part IV.C. among circuits listed as the "middle
ground." Although the Eighth Circuit has upheld the two Internet bans brought before it, it has
hinted that it would strike down bans for possession of child pornography in cases where there is
no evidence that the defendant distributed pornography. See infra notes 194-207 and accompany-
ing text. Further questioning of the Eighth Circuit's placement in this category is appropriate
when considering that both of the court's cases of Internet ban conditions utilized plain error
review. See United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Fields,
324 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).
172 Infra notes 188-93.
173 Paul, 274 F.3d at 169-70. The sentencing court ordered that Paul "shall not have [,] possess
or have access to computers, the Internet, photographic equipment, audio/video equipment, or any
item capable of producing a visual image." Id. at 160 (alteration in original).
174 See id. at 158. Paul was convicted of a crime involving child pornography approximately
fourteen years earlier. Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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Paul had downloaded several images of child pornography from the Internet, 177
and they also discovered photographs of children, magazines containing photo-
graphs of nude children, videotapes of children, and a large bag of children's
clothes. 78 Among the most unsettling items removed from his residence were
Spanish-language fliers advertising free lice removal services and promising
that Paul would perform a complete physical examination on each child.179
Paul pled guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced
to five years of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release.180
A complete ban on computer and Internet use was imposed as a term of the su-
pervised release.' 81 On appeal, Paul contended that the Internet ban was over-
broad. 182 Like Peterson, Paul pointed to the importance of the Internet in mod-
em day life and contended that such a broad restriction would prohibit him from
engaging in legitimate activities. 183 The court rejected this contention, and in so
doing noted the strong ties between Paul's dangerous behavior and computer
activities, including downloading pornography and advising others how to select
parents with children vulnerable to victimization.184 The court also rejected the
Tenth Circuit's rationale in United States v. White 8 5 that a complete Internet
ban would be overbroad because it would prevent the defendant from engaging
in some legitimate activities.1 86 The court noted the "strong evidentiary sup-
port"'187 for the conclusion that such a broad prohibition was reasonably neces-
sary and also observed that Paul could not show that such a ban would have an
impact on his employment or expressive activities. 188
177 The computer was found to contain over 1,200 images of child pornography. Id. at 160.
178 Id. at 158.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 158-59.
181 Id. at 160.
182 Id. at 167.
183 Id. at 168.
184 Id.
185 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
186 Paul, 274 F.3d at 169. The court stated:
[W]e reject the White court's implication that an absolute prohibition on ac-
cessing computers or the Internet is per se an unacceptable condition of su-
pervised release, simply because such a prohibition might prevent a defendant
from using a computer at the library to "get a weather forecast" or to "read a
newspaper online" during the supervised release term.
Id. at 169 (quoting White, 244 F.3d at 1206).
187 Id. at 170.
188 Id. Paul was primarily employed as a truck driver. Id. at 170 n.17.
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The Eleventh Circuit adopted Paul in its initial Internet ban case.18 9
Karl Zinn purchased, and had delivered to himself, two pornographic videotapes
of girls between the ages of six and thirteen. 90 The web site where he made his
purchase was an undercover operation by the United States Customs Service,
and when agents served a search warrant on his residence they discovered more
than 4,000 computer images of child pornography that he had admittedly ob-
tained through the Internet.' 9' The trial court imposed a condition of supervised
release restricting Internet access, and Zinn challenged this term before the
Eleventh Circuit. Although the appellate court acknowledged that the Internet
is important to modern life, it found more compelling the "need to protect both
the public and sex offenders themselves from [the Internet's] potential
abuses."'19 3 In upholding the Internet ban condition, the court noted that Zinn's
legitimate Internet use could be enabled through the clause permitting online
access with approval of the probation officer.
194
In its first case addressing the issue, the Eighth Circuit upheld a broad
Internet ban imposed upon an offender convicted of selling child pornogra-
phy.' 95 The trial court imposed a condition of supervision severely limiting
Keith Fields' ability to possess computers and use the Internet'96 after he was
convicted of operating a web site that sold child pornography. 97 On appeal,
Fields argued that the prohibition was overbroad; however, the Eighth Circuit
disagreed. 98 The court noted that the condition was reasonably related to the
offense of selling child pornography online and was designed to protect the pub-
189 United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
190 Id. at 1086.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1087. The sentencing court imposed the following: "You shall not possess or use a
computer with access to any on-line service at any location, including employment, without writ-
ten approval from the probation officer. This includes access through any Internet service pro-
vider, bulletin board system, or any public or private computer network system ... " Id.
193 Id. at 1093.
194 Id.
195 United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 2003).
196 Id. at 1026. The appellate opinion notes:
Condition seven prohibits Fields from "owning or operating any photographic
equipment including ...computers, scanners, and printers," and condition
eight states that he may not have [I]nternet service in his residence and may
only possess a computer if he is granted permission by his probation officer
and agrees to periodic inspections and other restrictions.
Id.
197 Id. The court noted that the website generated more than $22,000 in its eight months of
operation. Id.
198 Id. at 1026.
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lic by curbing similar future behavior.199 The court also found that the commer-
cial trafficking in child pornography permitted broader restrictions without run-
ning afoul of the statutory limitations on supervision conditions. 200 The Eighth
Circuit's repeated emphasis on the commercial nature of Fields' behavior to
justify imposition of a broad Internet ban implies that the court would not have
upheld such a broad ban had Fields' crime had been merely possession of child
pornography.2 °'
The Eighth Circuit later solidified its position as one that is more toler-
ant of broad Internet bans.20 2 Scott Ristine was arrested for possession of child
pornography after police found 111 computer disks, two hard drives, and three
videotapes containing child pornography in his home.20 3 Ristine admitted ex-
changing child pornography with other users. 204 He was sentenced to twenty-
seven months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, during
which use of computers required permission of the probation officer and instal-
lation of special hardware or software to monitor his computer use. 205
Ristine appealed the imposition of these conditions and cited cases from
other circuits striking down broad Internet bans.20 6 Noting that the Eighth Cir-
cuit was not among those rejecting Internet bans, the court analogized to Fields
207
and upheld Ristine's ban. The court reigned in its previous reliance on the
199 Id. at 1027 (citing Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1092-93 and United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169
(5th Cir. 2001) cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1002 (2002)).
200 Id. ("Selling subscriptions to child pornography is more serious than a possessory of-
fense.").
201 The court gave considerable attention to contrasting conditions of supervision for posses-
sory offenses and crimes involving "greater exploitation" by commenting: "Appellate courts have
overturned conditions seen as overly restrictive, especially in cases involving simple possession of
child pornography. In cases where defendants used computers or the [I]nternet to commit crimes
involving greater exploitation, such restrictions have been upheld." Id. (internal citations omit-
ted).
202 United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2003). The contention that the Eighth
Circuit is tolerant of broad bans may be questionable in light of the fact that review of both bans
were conducted under the plain error standard, a measure that errs toward affirming lower court
decisions. See supra note 171.
203 Ristine, 335 F.3d at 693. Police originally came into contact with Ristine when he con-
tacted an undercover online operation advertising tour services for trips to foreign countries during
which travelers could have sexual contact with minors. Id. After determining that he did not have
enough money to take such a trip, Ristine elected instead to purchase a videotape produced by the
"travel company" advertised as being a tape of boys and girls under the age of ten engaged in
sexual acts. Id.
204 Id. at 693.
205 Id. at 695-96.
206 Id. at 695-96 (citing United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) and United
States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003)).
207 Id. at 696-97.
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commercial nature of Fields' behavior but perpetuated the implication that it
would not approve a broad ban for "mere possession" of child pornography.
Unlike Fields, Ristine did not charge others a fee to access child pornography,
but he did distribute pornography to others. The court found this to be a "dis-
,,208tinction ... of no consequence. The distribution of child pornography evi-
denced a degree of exploitation beyond simple possession of illegal images such
that a broad Internet restriction was permissible.
C. The Middle Ground
In addition to the circuits discussed above, the Third, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits have also contributed to the jurisprudential discussion of the
Internet ban issue. Of these, the Third Circuit was the first to hear a sex of-
fender's challenge to Internet restrictions.209 This challenge came from Richard
Crandon, a New Jersey resident convicted of receiving child pornography.
210
Crandon, thirty-nine years old, met a fourteen-year-old girl in Minnesota
through the Internet.21 1 After exchanging correspondence for several months, he
traveled to Minnesota where he sexually abused the girl and took photographs of
her engaged in acts of abuse.212 He had the film developed after returning to
New Jersey.213 Two months later, Crandon returned to Minnesota and attempted
to take the girl back to New Jersey with him, but he abandoned his plan after
learning that the police were looking for them. 214 When he returned to New
Jersey, he was arrested, and police discovered the photographs.215
Crandon pled.guilty to receiving child pornography, and the trial court
imposed a sentence of incarceration followed by a three-year term of supervised
216release. Among the conditions of release, the court ordered Crandon to re-
frain from using the Internet, or any other computer network, without permis-
sion of the probation officer.21 7
208 Id. at 696.
209 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
210 Id. at 125.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 127 ("The defendant shall not possess, procure, purchase or otherwise obtain access to
any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers
unless specifically approved by the United States Probation Office.").
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Crandon challenged the imposition of an Internet ban, arguing that it
unnecessarily infringed upon his liberty and bore no logical relation to his of-
fense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583.218 He contended that the condition
would hamper his employment opportunities and infringe upon his freedoms of
speech and association. 219 However, the Third Circuit dismissed the argument
that supervision conditions infringing upon fundamental rights are invalid.220
Noting other cases in which fundamental rights were implicated by supervision
conditions, the court held that the Internet ban was permissible because "the
special condition [was] narrowly tailored and [was] directly related to deterring
Crandon and protecting the public.",
22
'
The subsequent decision in United States v. Freeman222 indicated that
the Third Circuit would be more scrutinizing of broad Internet bans than was
communicated in Crandon. Robb Freeman was arrested after an undercover
customs agent, in a face-to-face meeting, permitted Freeman to copy computer
files containing child pornography. 223 A subsequent search of Freeman's home
revealed additional digitized child pornography.224 After a guilty plea, the sen-
tencing court imposed a condition of supervised release prohibiting possession
of computer equipment and precluding Internet use without permission of the
probation officer.2
The Third Circuit ruled that the prohibition on computer possession and
Internet access was overbroad, and in so doing, distinguished Freeman's case
from Crandon.226 It noted that, unlike in Crandon, there was no evidence that
Freeman used the Internet to contact children.227 The court declared that it
218 Id.
219 Id. at 128.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 316 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2003).
223 Id. at 387.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 389-90. The court ordered:
Defendant is prohibited from having any computer equipment in [his] place of
residence. The defendant shall not possess or use a computer with access to
any on-line computer service at any location without the written approval of
the Probation Officer. This includes, although it is not limited to, any Internet
service provider, bulletin board system, or any other public or private com-
puter network.
Id. The order also provided for searches of his residence and the seizure of any computer equip-
ment or suspected pornography. Id. at 390.
226 Id. at 392.
227 Id.
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would allow the imposition of an Internet ban where a defendant used the ser-
vice to contact children; however, it would not be appropriate in Freeman's
case.228 The peculiar aspect of Freeman is that no explanation is given as to the
origins of Freeman's collection of child pornography found at his residence.
Whether he built his collection through online activities was apparently unim-
portant to the Third Circuit's evaluation of the Internet ban.229
The Tenth Circuit was first presented with the issue of Internet prohibi-
tions in United States v. White. 230 Robert E. White was in the federal penal sys-
tem after he made an online purchase of child pornography videotapes in a sting
conducted by the U.S. Customs Service. 3' White pled guilty and was sentenced
to two years of incarceration followed by a term of supervised release.232 After
his release from prison, White was re-incarcerated for twice violating conditions
of release, and the court modified his terms to add new special conditions.233
White challenged three of the supervised release conditions, including
the ban on possession of a computer with Internet access.234 White argued that
the Internet ban was flawed on two grounds. First, White contended that it im-
peded the rehabilitative goals of supervision by preventing him from conducting
research for a book he was writing.235 Second, White claimed that it also in-
fringed his First Amendment rights.236 The government relied on Crandon and
argued that the Internet ban was related to the offense.237 The Tenth Circuit first
noted that the order was flawed if it was meant to be a broad prohibition against
238all Internet use. By ordering that the defendant "not possess a computer with
Internet access, '239 the trial court did not preclude access to the Internet through
228 Id.
229 The Third Circuit's jurisprudence is not further illuminated by its decision in United States
v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 WL 179796 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2003). The court upheld, with little
comment, a condition banning Internet use without permission of the probation officer where the
defendant had been convicted of receiving child pornography and was found to have possessed
computer images of child pornography. Id. at *2.
230 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
231 Id. at 1201.
232 Id.
233 Id. White twice violated the terms of supervision by consuming alcohol. Id.
234 Id. at 1201. The trial court ordered that White "shall not possess a computer with Internet
access throughout his period of supervised release." Id. at 1205.
235 Id.
236 Id. The court did not decide whether the prohibition violated his First Amendment rights.
Id. at 1206.
237 See id. at 1206.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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240a computer not in White's possession, or via a device that is arguably not a
computer. 24  Further, the Tenth Circuit noted that if it was the trial court's in-
tention to prevent him from having any access to the Internet, its condition of
supervision was overreaching, as such a condition would "bar Mr. White from
using a computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a
newspaper online." 242 This language clearly points toward a disfavor of broad
Internet prohibitions.
Like the Second Circuit in Sofsky, the Tenth Circuit recommended other
methods it thought more appropriate to preclude White's access to child pornog-
raphy online.243 The court recommended using filtering software on White's
computer. 244 Having given some direction as to what is permissible, the appel-
late court remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of a reasonable
condition.245
The Tenth Circuit upheld an Internet prohibition in United States v.
Walser,246 but its decision did not signal a wide-ranging acceptance of broad
Internet bans. 47 Wyoming police, pursuant to a search warrant, searched a hotel
room registered to Russell Walser during an investigation into drug distribu-
tion.248 The Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation conducted a forensic
analysis of his computer and uncovered child pornography.249 Walser pled
guilty to possession of child pornography and was given a term of incarceration
followed by supervised release.2
240 E.g., at a library or cybercafe.
241 The court used web-t.v. as an example; however, a computer may be defined so broadly as
to include almost anything with a microchip. Mobile telephones now permit access to the Internet
and are arguably computers. This can pose definitional problems for courts and supervision agen-
cies. See, e.g., State ex rel. Allen v. Fabian, 658 N.W.2d 913, 914-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(prisoner contended in habeas petition that his probation was revoked for violation of Internet
prohibition when he purchased a cellular telephone with Internet capabilities). The Tenth Circuit
also questioned whether use of a computer with an internal modem is per se accessing the Internet.
White, 244 F.3d at 1205 n.7.
242 White, 244 F.3d at 1206.
243 Id.
244 Id. Filtering software controls the computer user's ability to access certain specified web-
pages that contain prohibited material. See id. at 1207 n.8.
245 Id. at 1207.
246 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1069 (2002).
247 See infra notes 254-56.
248 See Walser, 275 F.3d at 983.
249 Id. at 984-85.
250 Id. at 985.
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The trial court imposed upon Walser a condition of supervised release
prohibiting any Internet use without permission of the probation officer.25' In
permitting the condition to stand, the Tenth Circuit contrasted the language of
Walser's condition with the "ill-tailored ' 252 condition in White. The court noted
that Walser's condition was not a complete ban on all Internet use.253 Rather, it
appeared important to the court that the term only required that he get permis-
sion from the probation officer before accessing the Internet.254
Despite the court's decision in Walser, upholding the Internet ban, this
case is not a definite indication that the Tenth Circuit will uphold Internet bans
subject to probation officer approval in all cases where computer use is germane
to the crime or the offender's background. The court questioned whether the
restriction imposed involved a greater deprivation than necessary to meet sen-
tencing goals. 55 Specifically, the court posited that the vagueness of the condi-
tion may be used by the probation office to unreasonably prevent the defendant
from accessing the Internet.156 However, rather than resolving these important
issues, the Tenth Circuit held that they did not rise to the level of plain error, the
degree of scrutiny employed in that case. 7
In United States v. Scott, its first case on the subject, the Seventh Circuit
reversed a broad Internet ban258 and remanded it to be reformed by the sentenc-
ing court.259 Todd Scott was sentenced to a term of prison and supervised re-
lease for fraud; however, child pornography was discovered on his office com-
puter during the investigation of the fraud charges. 260 For that reason, the sen-
tencing court ordered that he not have access to the Internet.261 The appellate
court found the sentencing court's imposition of the condition unjustified;262
251 Id.
252 Id. at 988.
253 Id. at 988.
254 Id. This distinction between a complete ban and a ban on use without permission has been
adopted by at least one court outside the Tenth Circuit. See United States v. Deaton, 204 F. Supp.
2d 1181, 1183 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (modifying complete Internet prohibition to condition precluding
Internet use without permission of the probation office and establishing broad guidelines for grant
of permission).
255 Walser, 275 F.3d at 988.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2003).
259 Id. at 737.
260 Id. at 734.
261 Id. The trial court ordered that Scott "shall be prohibited from access to any Internet Ser-
vices without prior approval of the probation officer." Id.
262 Id. ("[H]ere the only justification [for the Internet ban] was misbehavior that neither re-
sulted in a conviction nor was treated as relevant conduct, making an outright ban difficult to
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however, the appellate court did not completely foreclose the possibility of up-
holding a broad Internet ban in another case.26 3 Judge Easterbrook wrote that
"[i]f Scott had used the Internet extensively to commit the crime of conviction,
then perhaps a ban might be justified. ''26 The Seventh Circuit had few instruc-
tions to guide the sentencing court upon remand,265 yet it did encourage the sen-
tencing court to provide precision in its conditions regarding online activity so
the probation officer would not be impermissibly tasked with the duty to deter-
266mine what was inappropriate.
Soon after Scott, the Seventh Circuit's holding in United States v.
Holm 267 signaled a more substantial objection to broad Internet bans. Delbert
Holm, an information system technologist by trade, pled guilty to possession of
child pornography after agents of the Illinois State Police found illegal pictures
on his computers and disks.268 The sentencing court imposed a condition of
supervision prohibiting possession or use of computer hardware or software
capable of accessing the Internet.269 Although the nexus between the Internet
and offense was much more substantial in Holm as compared to Scott, the Sev-
enth Circuit declared that the prohibition was overbroad.270 The court adopted
the Internet-telephone analogy271 and further noted the impact such a provision
would have on Holm's opportunities in his chosen profession, as it required
justify.").
263 Id. at 735.
264 Id. Judge Easterbrook also noted that if a judge was unable to place restrictions on online
access, that judge may be more inclined to incarcerate the offender than to permit unfettered ac-
cess to the Internet. Id. at 736-37 ("If full access posed an unacceptable risk of recidivism, yet all
controls on access were forbidden, then a judge would have little alternative but to increase the
term of imprisonment in order to incapacitate the offender.").
265 See id. at 737 ("What conditions short of a ban may be appropriate in this case is a subject
for the district judge to address in the first instance.").
266 See id. at 736.
267 326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003).
268 Id. at 873-74. The Seventh Circuit noted that Holm downloaded "more than 100,000 por-
nographic images, approximately 10 to 20% of which depicted underage children engaged in
sexually explicit activity." Id.
269 Id. at 877. The trial court ordered:
You shall not possess or use a computer that is equipped with a modem, that
allows access to any part of the Internet, e-mail service, or other "on-line" ser-
vices. You shall not possess software expressly used for connecting to online
service, including e-mail, or installation disks for online services or e-mail.
Id.
270 Id.
271 See id. at 879; see also supra text accompanying note 156.
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working with computers.272 Rather than impose a broad Internet ban, the court
encouraged the use of a more limited restriction with enforcement through com-
puter searches and filtering software.2 73
D. State Courts
The degree of divergence concerning Internet restrictions among the
federal circuits is not found across state systems.274 Although many states re-
quire that a special condition of supervision be reasonably related to the crime,
offender, or protection of the public, 5 there typically does not exist the formal
statutory restriction on a judge's discretion similar to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b) and
3583(d). The few courts that have heard challenges to Internet bans have rati-
fied the prohibitions.276 For instance, a Washington appellate court affirmed the
imposition of a ban on computer use where the offender groomed his five- and
six-year old victims by showing them pornography and having them reenact the
poses in the pictures.277 Similarly, an Idaho court let stand an order to remove
all computers from the home of a probationer who fondled his victim while he
showed her pornography on a computer.278 In what may be the ruling most sup-
portive of an Internet ban, an Indiana appellate court approved a complete ban
on computer and online access in a case where there was no indication of com-
puter or online use related to the crime.279 The court noted that the Internet ban
was an effort to block the defendant's access to prohibited material which, if left
unregulated, would "provide a temptation of such a magnitude that exposure to
it would not be in the best interests of [the defendant's] rehabilitation." 28°
It is clear from the survey of courts weighing computer and Internet
prohibitions that considerable divergence exists.28' There will certainly be many
272 Holm, 326 F.3d at 878. The Seventh Circuit noted that Holm presented "undisputed evi-
dence" that he did not use any computer system at work to download child pornography; however,
the court did not discuss whether a finding that he did use the Internet would have permitted im-
position of broad Internet restrictions. See id.
273 Id. at 879.
274 See infra text accompanying notes 274-79.
275 See supra note 145.
276 See, e.g., State v. Combs, 10 P.3d 1101, 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). Because most states
do not have the statutory or jurisprudential equivalent of the "reasonably necessary" requirement
in 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (2000), state courts may have more flexibility in fashioning conditions of
supervision. See supra note 145.
277 See Combs, 10 P.3d at 1103.
278 See State v. Wardle, 53 P.3d 1227, 1228-30 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
279 See Smith v. State, 779 N.E.2d 111, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
280 Id.
281 See supra note 150.
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opportunities in the future for courts to clarify the degree to which conditions
can justifiably restrict Internet access for sexual offenders under community
correctional supervision. As this area of law further develops, consideration
should be given to several factors that, if ignored, could hamper effective super-
vision and undermine rehabilitative and public safety goals.
V. A FUTURE DIRECTION FOR EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION
The most effective community correctional supervision techniques have
both reactive and proactive aspects.282 Ideally, terms of supervision should
permit the supervising agency to adequately detect and respond to all material
violations. It is through the effective detection and response to violations that
these practices acquire proactive facets, deterring future violative conduct.283
The Supreme Court has recognized that both components are valid interests of
284the government.
As the law related to adjudicated sex offenders and computers continues
to develop, courts should be mindful of undermining legitimate government
interests served by supervision practices. More specifically, courts should ex-
pressly sanction the use of random suspicionless computer searches to verify
compliance with supervision terms and resist any efforts to establish a per se
rule that Internet prohibitions are overbroad.
A. Limitations on Internet Access
Circuit courts that are intolerant of supervision conditions prohibiting
all Internet use 285 have yet to thoroughly examine all of the material aspects of
the issue. Their decisions misjudge the problems inherent in permitting online
access, miscalculate the degree of deprivation to individual defendants, and mis-
understand the purpose of the conditions.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
283 The Classical School of criminological theory and much of public policy is based on simple
principles of hedonistic calculus. See COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Athlone Press 1970) ("The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is
sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence."). See generally FRANK P. WILLIAMS III &
MARILYN D. MCSHANE, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 16-17 (2d ed. 1994). All other things being
equal, a potential offender who perceives the likelihood of getting caught as high is more likely to
be dissuaded from committing the contemplated crime than one who thinks detection and capture
are unlikely.
284 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (noting that a warrant requirement
would make the supervision agency less able to "respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, and
would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise
create") (internal citations omitted).
285 See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 981 (2003).
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Appellate courts striking down Internet restrictions have not fully com-
prehended the risks posed by sex offenders in the online world. Recommenda-
tions made to supervising authorities by these courts demonstrate that they do
not fully appreciate the opportunities to misuse online access. For instance, the
Tenth Circuit suggested the use of filtering software to screen out inappropriate
materials online.286 Although employing this software can give the correctional
system and court a sense of "doing something," the advice suggests that access
to pornography is the only activity to be monitored.
Recognizing filtering software as sufficient to prevent online malfea-
sance is flawed in many ways. Filtering software is considered an inefficient
means of blocking access to inappropriate material.287 However, were it com-
pletely effective in blocking access to pornographic and child-oriented web
pages, it would not address the considerable threat posed by sex offenders ac-
288cessing chat rooms. Moreover, filtering technology would not prevent an
offender from sending or receiving inappropriate photographs via email. Fur-
thermore, as new pages are introduced onto the web every day, it would be prac-
tically impossible for a supervision officer to ensure that the software's direc-
tory of inappropriate web pages remained current.289 These issues suggest that
filtering software is not a comprehensive or effective supervision technique, as
much as it is a hook upon which a court can hang its hat to believe that it is do-
ing something to contain the risk presented by sex offenders online.
Suggestions made by the Second Circuit similarly evince the dangerous
belief that pornography use is the sole danger to be monitored online.29° In Sof
sky, the court suggested that a supervision condition banning Internet access
could be modified to a prohibition on online pornography use.29 1 The court
noted that such a condition could be monitored through computer searches and
government stings inviting sex offenders to respond to ads for pornography sur-
reptitiously placed on the Internet by the government. 292 Again, these provi-
sions do not respond to any of the supervision concerns that Internet access can
be used to traffic child pornography through means other than web pages, to
maintain child contact, to easily receive and disseminate information about of-
286 See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001).
287 The Tenth Circuit acknowledges the limited effectiveness of filtering software. Id.
("[N]one of the software presently available is completely effective.").
288 There is also some question whether filtering software would adequately control access to
inappropriate newsgroups that are not technically on the World Wide Web and not accessed by
normal browsing software such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator.
289 Some filtering software packages require the person filtering (i.e., the probation officer,
parent, etc.) to manually list the web pages that are off limits.
290 See Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126-27.
291 Id. at 127.
292 Id.
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fending, and to network in a manner that supports and encourages offending
behavior.293
Courts that have stricken Internet bans have not thoroughly examined
the degree to which Internet bans involve deprivations of individual liberty. The
Tenth Circuit noted that banning a defendant from the Internet "would bar [him]
from using a computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or
read a newspaper online. 294 The Tenth Circuit, however, declined to note that
the Internet is not the exclusive means of conducting research or that weather
forecasts and news can be received regularly through print, television, and radio
media.295 Although the Internet has placed more information at our fingertips
and made certain everyday activities easier, there is very little that can be done
in the virtual world that cannot be accomplished in the "brick and mortar"
world. Tax returns can still be filed through the mail, banking is still offered at
local branches, news is available on broadcast television, and communication
remains possible through the telephone and United States Postal Service.
To support their determination that Internet bans are overbroad, the Sec-
ond and Tenth Circuits have analogized an Internet ban to a prohibition on the
use of telephones for fraud offenses.296 However, this analogy is defective in at
least two ways. First, it is misleading as to the degree of deprivation placed
upon the offender. When prohibiting a person from using the telephone, a court
is prohibiting the offender from using the most prevalent communication device
available in modern life, including the most practical means of summoning
emergency assistance. Conversely, the Internet is not used for emergency pur-
poses and is not the most prevalent communication device. Although preclud-
ing online access may require someone to resort to slower forms of communica-
tion, it does not fundamentally alter the scope of legitimate activities one can
undertake. There is currently very little that can be done exclusively on the
Internet that would be considered necessary for more than a few people. Until
293 For a discussion of ways pedophiles misuse the Internet, see supra notes 45-71 and accom-
panying text. Some may argue that use of the Internet restriction to prevent participation in pedo-
philic support or information networks would violate the First Amendment right to peaceable
assembly. However, conditions of supervision that impinge fundamental rights are permissible if
"primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public ...." United
States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997). The prevention of networking among sex
offenders (outside the supervision of a treating psychologist or psychiatrist) aims to foster reha-
bilitation by ensuring that the treatment goals are not undermined and protects the public through
the same process.
294 United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001).
295 White contended that he needed access to the Internet to conduct research for a book he was
writing. Id. at 1205. Although it is unlikely that many adjudicated sex offenders are conducting
online research in preparation for publishing, many more would likely make such claims if having
aspirations of writing is key to gaining Internet access.
296 See United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Although a defendant might
use the telephone to commit fraud, this would not justify a condition of probation that includes an
absolute bar on the use of telephones."); White, 244 F.3d at 1207.
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the Internet grants unique opportunities or privileges,297 courts should consider
the available alternatives when determining whether a ban is overbroad.298
The telephone analogy is also flawed because it fails to acknowledge
the degree to which public safety interests are served by the supervision condi-
tion.299 In the Second Circuit's example of prohibiting a defendant convicted of
fraud from using a telephone, the court is presumably attempting to prevent
other citizens from losing some of their money or possessions. In this example,
the weighing of individual and government interests, at first glance, does appear
imbalanced. However, by precluding a convicted sex offender from accessing
the Internet, the court attempts to guard the public from a most personal crime 300
that society presumably has a greater interest in preventing.
30 1
Another aspect of the government interest yet to be considered by some
circuits is in preventing activities that will undermine effective rehabilitation.
Most sex offenders placed on supervision are ordered into a sex offender treat-
302 303ment program.30 2 One legitimate goal of relapse prevention, a component of
297 An example that may be realized in the not-too-distant future is the use of the Internet to
transmit real-time patient vital signs and other medical information from the patient's home moni-
tors to medical experts hundreds of miles away. In this example, the alternative to the Internet use
would be to send the patient to the distant city. The alternative is not a truly practical alternative,
especially where long-term monitoring would require a residential move. This example is dis-
similar to the alternatives between sending a letter instead of email or watching the Weather
Channel instead of logging on.
298 Perhaps the better analogy is to a condition of probation prohibiting a car-theft offender
from operating a motor vehicle during the term of supervision. Where the defendant lives in a
metropolitan area with mass transportation, such a condition is more likely permissible due to
available alternatives, than where the defendant lives in a rural area with no other means of trans-
portation to an employment hub.
299 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2000).
300 Sexual assault, including child molestation, often has devastating effects on its victim that
far outweigh those encountered by property crime victims. For discussions of those effects, see
Jim Hopper, Sexual Abuse of Males: Prevalence, Possible Lasting Effects, and Resources, at
http://www.jimhopper.comlmale-ab/#ast (last visited Aug. 19, 2003); Sexual Abuse, at
http:/lwww.dmh.missouri.govlcps/facts/cpssex.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
301 It is appropriate to consider the nature of the harm to be avoided when determining reason-
ableness. This notion is present in many aspects of American law. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d 717, 738 (U.S. Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (discussing national security inter-
ests). In Judge Hand's classic case explaining negligence, the "gravity of the resulting injury" is
considered to determine negligence (i.e., reasonableness). United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
302 See generally McKay, supra note 59, at 18-19.
303 This term refers to the component of treatment that is squarely directed at the planning
process for preventing re-offending. Although all aspects of treatment are generally related to
prevention of re-offending (e.g., victim empathy or reframing cognitive distortions), relapse pre-
vention is focused squarely upon the offender's plan for coping strategies in future risk situations.
For a good discussion of the relapse process and relapse prevention planning, see William D.
Pithers, Relapse Prevention with Sexual Aggressors, in HANDBOOK OF SExuAL ASSAULT, supra
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many treatment programs, is to structure the offender's environment in a manner
that is not conducive to offending.3°4 To the degree that the Internet facilitates
offending behavior, it is an appropriate target of judicial supervision or control.
Using online access to seek out pornography or communicate with other sex
offenders in a manner that supports offending undermines the rehabilitative
process.
To say that courts should weigh the considerations above when deter-
mining the permissibility of Internet restrictions is not to advocate that all sex
offenders must be broadly banished from the virtual world. Reasonable courts
weighing specific circumstances may conclude that public safety is not jeopard-
ized when a sex offender accesses the Internet with adequate relapse prevention
strategies in place. 30 5 However, courts should not presume that online access is
appropriate for each offender who did not use, or was not known to have used,
computers in the commission of the crime.3° Instead, judges determining the
appropriateness of Internet limitations should assess the offender's legitimate
need for Internet access and the objective risk of misuse posed by that of-
fender.
30 7
note 15, at 343, 346-60.
304 See BARRY M. MALETZKY, TREATING THE SEXUAL OFFENDER 152-54 (1991). Maletzky
observes that for most offenders, "the offense requires the availability of a victim, the absence of
sure detection ... and [individual] variables such as the level of general sexual arousal at the
time." Id. at 152.
305 In fact, a cogent argument can be made that Internet access can reduce offender risk. By
permitting an offender to engage in activities that would otherwise require public contact (e.g., to
shop for books or groceries, or to watch a movie), the Internet can reduce the chances of an of-
fender coming into contact with children. Setting aside important concerns about the complete
isolation of the offender, this argument may have some merit. However, if an offender's impulse
control and relapse prevention planning are so poor that the offender is unable to choose an ap-
propriate time and place to do grocery shopping or other personal tasks, it is unlikely that Internet
access would be appropriate without strict monitoring capabilities.
306 The circuits assessing limitations on computer use for sex offenders have apparently shown
great deference to the issue of computer use in the crime charged. See, e.g., United States v. Scott,
316 F.3d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 2003) ("If Scott had used the Internet extensively to commit the crime
of conviction, then perhaps a ban might be justified."); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83
(2d Cir. 2001) ("There is no indication that Peterson's past incest offense had any connection to
computers or to the Internet."). Courts should not place too much reliance upon this factor, as
doing so serves only to be reactive. Permitting an offender to have online access merely because
there is no known history of a computer-crime connection fails to be proactive by controlling the
manner in which an increasing number of offenders commit their crimes.
307 It seems to some extent improper - but a practical necessity - for courts to also consider
the resources available to the supervising agency. Funding dedicated to probation and parole
supervision programs is paltry, and supervision of computer activity may deplete time and funding
capabilities of these agencies, especially when it requires detailed analysis of computer hardware.
Some courts may have reservations about forcibly dedicating the limited resources of a supervi-
sion agency to computer supervision or making supervision officers "Internet babysitters." For an
illustration of the strained conditions under which supervision agencies operate, see Melvin Clax-
ton. Felons on Probation Go Unwatched, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 10, 2002, at IA, noting that in
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When a sentencing court grants access to computers and the Internet,
other conditions should be in place to ensure that the computer is not used for
criminal purposes or to undermine the sex offender treatment process. Some
supervision agencies attempt to detect and deter such misuse through random
searches of computer equipment.
B. Permissible Computer Searches
The Supreme Court has established that persons convicted of crimes are
subject to some diminishment of constitutional rights.3 °8 When a citizen con-
victed of a sex crime is subject to a search condition, the offender's reasonable
expectation of privacy is reduced.309 The government interest in supervision is
simultaneously increased, especially in cases of child sexual victimization.310
For these reasons, courts should expressly hold that suspicionless community
supervision searches of sexual offenders' computers do not offend Fourth
Amendment requirements when conducted pursuant to a valid condition of su-
pervision and performed in a reasonable manner.31'
Wayne County, Michigan, 249 probation officers are charged with monitoring more than 30,000
people under supervision.
308 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).
309 See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventative State, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 771, 804 (1998).
310 Those convicted of sexual crimes pose a greater risk of future offending than do members of
the general law-abiding public, and can therefore be subjected to "a degree of impingement upon
privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large." Griffin v. Wisconsin.,
483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987). Research indicates that significant numbers of sex offenders are rear-
rested for subsequent offenses. See Hanson & Bussi~re, supra note 35, at 351 (noting that meta-
analysis showed that thirteen percent of child molesters were arrested for a new sexual offenses
within four to five years, approximately thirty-seven percent were arrested for any (sexual or non-
sexual) new offense). Even more, rearrest rates yield a conservative estimate of true re-offending,
as many sexual offenses go undetected. See id. The reasonable probability of recidivism, coupled
with the high physical and social costs of sexual offending, increase the government interest in
preventing re-offenses among sexual offenders compared to other offender populations.
311 Because this conclusion is based in part upon the serious social costs and risks posed spe-
cifically by sex offenders, it is expressly limited to adjudicated sex offenders and those supervised
pursuant to a deferred adjudication regime that requires substantiation of the defendant's guilt.
See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(a) (Vernon 2003). Whether suspicionless
searches are permissible when they involve different felony offenders or at different stages of the
trial process (e.g., pre-trial supervision) is outside the scope of this article.
The Second Circuit implied that random suspicionless searches are permissible when it
recommended searches in lieu of a broad ban on Internet access. United States v. Sofsky, 287
F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 981 (2003); accord United States v. Holm,
326 F.3d 872, at 879 (7th Cir. 2003), ("The district court... imposed the condition that [the de-
fendant] be subjected to random searches of his computer and residence - a condition we find
entirely reasonable.").
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Unreasonableness of a supervision search can be identified by examin-
ing the time and manner in which the search is conducted, the motivation and
scope of the search, and the identity of the searcher. Unreasonableness is cer-
tainly signaled when a search is "arbitrary, capricious or harassing."312 Searches
conducted during deep-night hours, except in exigent circumstances or where
the offender observes a nocturnal lifestyle, and searches performed out of hostil-
ity toward the offender do not further legitimate public interests and should
never be considered reasonable.
The scope of a search may also be used to determine reasonableness. A
sentencing court may limit the scope of a suspicionless search by express terms
in the condition.313 In the absence of such a limitation, courts should permit
suspicionless searches of the complete computer hard drive, floppy disks, and
any other computer media storage device. Limiting supervision searches to only
specified sections of a computer drive would reduce the effectiveness of
searches, as the offender who keeps prohibited materials would know to simply
bury these materials in computer files outside the permissible scope of the offi-
cer's search.
In the absence of express limitation by the sentencing court, the suspi-
cionless search authority should also extend to places where removable disks or
drives are likely to be found.314 It would seem inconsistent with the purposes of
the search to permit the noncompliant offender to defeat the search by simply
removing a disk containing child pornography and putting it in a drawer of the
desk upon which the computer sits. Places where disks and devices are likely to
be found may include desk drawers, disk storage boxes, and other places where
that individual offender has been known to place these items. To prevent the
searching officer from using the suspicionless computer search to conduct a
broad search of the whole home, a search that moves from places where disks
and other devices are likely to be found to places where disks and other devices
may be found would have to be supported by articulable reasonable suspicion.315
312 People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998).
313 For example, a court may order that the defendant permit the supervision officer to inspect
the content of any computer file that records or otherwise identifies the web sites visited by the
computer user. In a Windows-based computer, this could limit an officer's search to Temporary
Internet and Cookies files.
314 How one determines whether such materials would "likely" be found in a given location is
outside the scope of this article. Such a determination would necessarily have to be broad - that
is, not bound to a requirement of individualized suspicion - so as not to swallow whole the sus-
picionless nature of the computer search. In other words, if the supervision officer must have
reasonable suspicion to believe a disk is in the desk drawer, such a requirement could effectively
nullify the officer's ability to conduct a suspicionless search of the disk once found. However,
some outer limit would have to be established on an officer's ability to search for disks and other
similar items.
315 This does not consider whether additional authority to search beyond the computer - to
look for pornographic magazines, children's toys, weapons, or other items - may be conducted
pursuant to a valid search order. At first glance, I see no reason to find otherwise.
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The identity of the searcher should impact the reasonableness inquiry of
a suspicionless supervision search. The "purpose test" of probation searches
formerly employed by the Ninth Circuit316 was effectively deemed irrelevant by
the Supreme Court's decision in Knights.3t 7 However, its underlying rationale
has merit, and the test should be resurrected with some modification for suspi-
cionless searches. Rather than attempting to determine the purpose of the
search, courts should look to the identity of the agency conducting the suspi-
cionless search, with supervision officers being the exclusive agents permitted
to conduct permissible suspicionless searches.3t8 This modified test has two
advantages to the original "purpose" test. First, differentiating between supervi-
sion and law enforcement officers better preserves the logical underpinnings of
the administrative search doctrine. Second, it provides an objective bright-line
test that is more easily and reliably applied than a test discerning the purpose of
a search.
To prevent the supervision purposes of the suspicionless search from
becoming a tool for impermissible circumvention of the Fourth Amendment
requirements, courts should restrict the authority to conduct suspicionless super-
vision searches to community correctional agencies. 319 The police and correc-
tional supervision agencies may serve the same primary goal of public safety,
but blurring the lines between the two would threaten to undermine the logic
underlying the Supreme Court's crucial distinction between correctional super-
vision and law enforcement agencies. 320 In this respect, suspicionless supervi-
sion searches should not be employed as subterfuge for police investigative pur-
poses.
32 1
316 See supra note 113 (discussing probation searches and investigation searches).
317 See supra notes 116-17.
318 This article focuses only on the distinction between the searching authority of correctional
supervision officers and law enforcement officers. Whether other government agencies (e.g.,
child welfare agencies) can conduct suspicionless searches under the authority of correctional
supervision conditions is outside the scope of this article.
319 Whether a law enforcement officer may act under the direction of the supervision officer to
conduct suspicionless searches is outside the scope of this article.
320 The correctional supervision search is analyzed under the administrative search doctrine
precisely because supervision agencies are not law enforcement agencies. To blur the distinctions
between the two would erode the underlying argument for treating supervision searches as admin-
istrative searches. The Ninth Circuit has noted the different roles of supervision officers and law
enforcement officers. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1975) ("A good parole
officer does not regard himself as a policeman.").
321 Cf. United States v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The Ninth Circuit recently held that reasonable suspicion
is required for FBI agents to conduct a parole search of an offender's residence. United States v.
Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated pending rehearing en banc, _ F.3d
No. 01-50633, 2003 WL 22061604, (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2003).
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One new technology designed to assist in the supervision of sex offend-
ers' computer use is dependent upon the permissibility of suspicionless
searches. Monitoring software has been developed to record the computer use
of the designated defendant. Originally designed to enable parents to monitor
children's online activities, correctional agencies and software developers have
modified it to watch what sex offenders do and where they go online.322 Unlike
filtering software that simply blocks inappropriate websites, monitoring soft-
ware actually takes a "snapshot" of the computer screen when the software de-
tects possible violations, permitting the officer to see what the defendant saw
and preserving the evidence for use in a hearing.323 The software monitors chat,
instant messaging, and web surfing, and when it detects a possible violation,
such as when the user types in a word or message on its alert list, 324 it takes a
snapshot of the screen and preserves it for review by the supervision officer.325
The software can also automatically generate an email to the supervision officer
to warn of the possible violation.326
The use of this monitoring software likely constitutes a suspicionless
search.32 7 Yet, ironically, this technology may constitute many offenders' best
hope of having some limited Internet access in jurisdictions that permit broad
bans on Internet access. 328 When the choice is between unfettered access, or at
322 John O'Connor, Software Helps Officers Monitor Sex Offenders, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 7, 2002, at B5.
323 Id.
324 The officer can program the software to begin recording when it detects the entry of certain
phrases, such as "Do you like to kiss men?".
325 See O'Connor, supra note 322. The software stores the screen image in a password-
protected database that the officer can review when conducting a search of the computer files.
Some software packages record a snapshot at designated time intervals known only by the super-
vision officer.
326 See John Schwartz, Internet Leash Can Monitor Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001,
at Cl.
327 Two alternative rationales may be argued that would permit the use of monitoring software
under the reasonable suspicion rubric of Knights. One is that placement of software settings to
activate the recording when certain keystrokes are made or when certain websites are contacted, in
essence, permits the computer software to determine when reasonable suspicion exists. Another
possible contention is that the particular circumstances of sex offenders - because they are suffi-
cient to warrant imposition of monitoring software - create a static "reasonable suspicion" that is
always attached to the defendant. This latter approach would have precarious consequences, as
the free-floating existence of reasonable suspicion, according to Knights, would justify a police
officer's search at any time.
328 One may argue that the offender consents to the suspicionless search to obtain Internet
privileges. This may be a viable claim; however, because the Supreme Court has remained silent
on the voluntariness of consent by probationers and parolees, there exists cause to believe that
such consent is not voluntary if failure to consent yields a complete Internet ban. Cf. United
States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 717 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated pending rehearing en banc, -
F.3d -, No. 01-50633, 2003 WL 22061604 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2003).
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best, filtered access, and no access at all, many courts may be reluctant to permit
online activity without some reliable method of supervising and responding to
high-risk behaviors. When the court is offered a third choice of effective super-
vision of Internet use, the necessity for an outright prohibition becomes more
questionable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many aspects of the Internet and the nation's computerization have im-
plications for the supervision of sexual offenders. As technology enables a user
to easily and secretly store away a few pictures, amass a large collection of child
pornography, or network with others to facilitate the abuse of children, effective
supervision techniques should prevent this technology from being used to facili-
tate higher levels of risk. Courts should endorse the permissibility of suspi-
cionless computer searches by probation and parole agencies when conducted in
compliance with a valid court order or administrative regulation and performed
in a reasonable manner. Additionally, when determining the acceptability of
supervision conditions prohibiting Internet access, courts should consider the
public safety and individual liberty interests in depth, taking into consideration
the dangers sought to be avoided and the alternatives available to the offender.
To do otherwise would permit sex offenders to escape accountability for their
online behaviors that impact sexual offending. More importantly, it would
threaten to undermine the efficacy of community supervision and unnecessarily
risk public protection.
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